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According to general learning theory two
major forms of learning can be observed
across species. These universal forms of
learning are classical and operant con-
ditioning (Tarpy, 1997). Although both
forms of conditioning can occur in the
absence of awareness of the contingencies
between CS (conditioned stimulus) and
UCS (unconditioned stimulus) (or action –
consequence contingencies) (Huston and
Oitzl, 1989; Clark and Squire, 1998), close
temporal proximity between a CS and
a UCS is required to form an associa-
tion. In other words, long-term association
between a CS and a UCS (or an operant
and its consequence) requires two distinct
events to occur simultaneously or with little
delay (in the range of ms) between them.
Now let us consider the following ques-
tion: Can two events be associated or inte-
grated into a linked mnemonic representa-
tion even if they happen at different times
(with a delay of more than 1 min between
the two events) and if one of these events
is not detected consciously? The conven-
tional answer would be “certainly not.”
However, the research article “Integrating
events across levels of consciousness” by
Henke et al. (2013) demonstrates that this
is indeed possible by showing that two
temporally distant events that have plainly
generated memories both conscious and
unconscious were integrated mentally into
a linked mnemonic representation.
In Henke et al.’s (2013) study par-
ticipants sequentially viewed various
unrelated word-pairs such as “tree desk.”
Half of these pairs shared one member, for
example “tree desk” and “desk fish” to pro-
mote event integration. The experimental
procedure varied the delay between the
presentations of the two word-pairs with a
shared member in a way that would pre-
clude simple forms of latent learning due to
classical conditioning. Moreover, one word
pair was presented subliminally (invisible)
while the other word pair was presented
supraliminally (visible). Nevertheless par-
ticipants integrated the two word-pairs
(events) into a linked mnemonic represen-
tation by judging the word pair that shared
one member as semantically closer than the
word-pairs that did not shared a member.
This judgment of semantic relatedness was
evident even if the two word-pairs were
temporally distant, i.e., presented at dif-
ferent times. Henke et al. (2013) conclude
that this finding suggests that: “connec-
tions between mental representations or
between nodes in the semantic network,
which have been co-activated in the same
encoding context, acquire a greater link-
age strength leading to the impression of
stronger conceptual relatedness.”
This interpretation has important
implications for the question of how
we generate our knowledge and concepts
about the world. Much of that knowl-
edge results from integrating memories for
specific events or experiences into seman-
tic concepts (Squire and Zola, 1998). For
example, our concept of a “restaurant visit”
consists of a sequence or chain of events
and actions one must perform within a
particular setting to qualify it as a “restau-
rant visit.” These single sequences have
been distilled from the integrated mem-
ories of many events that happened at
different times and that can be roughly
classified as “restaurant visits,” including
visits, e.g., to fast food and sushi restau-
rants. However, the mechanisms underly-
ing this type of concept formation are still
unknown. Given that no explicit inten-
tion exists to form a concept or to inte-
grate similar events that happened at dif-
ferent times into a semantic concept, this
process must be initiated unconsciously
possibly due to a hidden concept formation
algorithm that detects similarities between
events that happened at different times and
places.
The findings show that conscious and
unconscious memories for events that hap-
pened at different times can join together
into a mnemonic representation. The work
by Henke et al. (2013) further suggest that
people possess learning capabilities that do
not fall under the categories of declara-
tive and non-declarative memory systems
(Squire, 2004). These new findings imply
that people might have at least one quali-
tatively different learning mechanism that
cannot be classified within this categori-
cal dichotomy. The results by Henke et al.
reveal a learning process not dependent on
consciousness (declarative memory) and
that violates the principle that a close spa-
tial and temporal contiguity is essential
for classical conditioning (non-declarative
memory).
In future studies, it would be worth to
determine the maximum temporal delay
between supra- and subliminally presented
word-pairs, that would still allow an associ-
ation between those word-pairs, that share
a member, but have been presented at
different times. Another interesting ques-
tion to ask would be to test whether
the maximum temporal delay could be
extended by using shared member words
that have an emotional valence or would
induce an emotional arousal. If it turns out
that the delay between the presentation of
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word-pairs can be extended to several min-
utes or even up to hours, such a finding
would indicate that the association formed
is not exclusively due to a priming phe-
nomenon as it has been suggested by the
authors.
An interesting direction for future stud-
ies would be the examination of neurobi-
ological underpinnings of this unique type
of learning. These studies could broaden
our knowledge on the fascinating interplay
between our conscious and unconscious
memories and mental lives.
The findings by Henke et al. might
also have implications for the concept
of episodic memory that is thought to
be part of the declarative memory sys-
tem. Episodic memories are extremely
vivid and detailed memories for specific
events and their spatial–temporal context
(Dere et al., 2010; Pause et al., 2013). We
have postulated that episodic memories
are generated without an explicit inten-
tion to do so (automatically or uncon-
sciously) through a learning mechanism
that resembles classical conditioning trig-
gered by events that are emotionally arous-
ing. Furthermore, we have postulated that
the temporal context of an event is con-
structed by relating or associating the event
to episodic memories (so-called “anchor
events”) that have been generated earlier
and to episodic memories that will be gen-
erated in the future. In this way, the tem-
poral context of an event is reconstructed
and stored as temporal order informa-
tion, e.g., event B happened after event A
but prior to event C (Dere et al., 2004,
2008, 2010; Pause et al., 2013; Zlomuz-
ica et al., 2014). The findings by Henke
et al. seem to support our concept of
episodic memory formation by showing
that the strict distinction between declar-
ative and non-declarative memories might
not account for all forms of learning and
memory, including episodic memories and
that an association between temporally dis-
tant events in terms of temporal order
relationships can indeed be formed auto-
matically/unconsciously.
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